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Domestic and international responses to bovine spongi-form encephalopathy (BSE) 
in North America have permanently 
altered international market oppor-
tunities for U.S. beef. As expected, 
most international markets imme-
diately banned imports of U.S. beef 
when the fi rst U.S. case was report-
ed in December 2003. Beef and beef 
variety meat exports in 2004 fell 75 
percent by volume and 79 percent 
by value compared with 2003 levels. 
By April 2005, strong demand from 
Mexico and the reopening of a few 
markets helped overcome some of 
the overall trade loss, but most ma-
jor markets remained closed to U.S. 
beef (see Table 1).
The second U.S. case of BSE, of-
fi cially confi rmed in June 2005, set 
back much of the progress made in 
re-opening international markets. 
Taiwan, Indonesia, and several 
other countries that had re-opened 
their borders to U.S. beef reinstated 
bans, and South Korea immediately 
expressed strong reluctance to 
move forward with negotiations to 
resume trade. However, the rush by 
Taiwanese consumers to purchase 
discounted U.S. beef already on 
store shelves indicates that, at least 
for some consumers, low price out-
weighed any concern over the safety 
of U.S. beef, if such concern existed. 
Early reports from Taiwan indicated 
that reinstating the ban may have 
been an automatic reaction that will 
be reversed, but it is diffi cult to say 
how long a reversal will take.
On the other hand, the Japa-
nese government’s calm reaction 
to the news of a second BSE case 
in the United States refl ected the 
stated expectation that more than 
one BSE-positive animal would be 
found in the United States. It may 
also refl ect the fact that Japan has 
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yet to set a timeline for opening its 
borders to U.S. and Canadian beef, 
and confl icting test results in the 
second case appear to be causing 
additional delays by Japan.
CONSUMER OPINION AND THE BEEF 
SAFEGUARD IN JAPAN
Although the Japanese government 
remains committed to negotiations 
to reopen its market, U.S. exporters 
will face new marketing challenges 
when access is allowed. With 20 
confi rmed cases of BSE and 100 
percent testing of cattle, reports 
of new cases in Japan’s cattle herd 
have little impact on overall con-
sumer behavior. However, surveys 
continue to show strong consumer 
opinion against resuming imports 
of U.S. beef under the terms of the 
Beef Export Verifi cation Program 
drafted by Japan and the United 
States. Although consumer opin-
ion often does not refl ect actual 
purchasing decisions and not all 
Japanese consumers will shun 
U.S. beef, the Australian industry’s 
classifi cation as free of BSE and its 
unchallenged hold on the Japanese 
market will make it diffi cult for U.S. 
beef to re-capture market share.
Another obstacle for U.S. beef is 
Japan’s safeguard system. The safe-
guard is triggered when imports in-
crease by more than 17 percent from 
volumes imported during the previ-
ous Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) on a 
cumulative quarterly basis. Once trig-
gered, the beef tariff increases from 
38.5 percent to 50 percent and the 
safeguard remains in place for the 
remainder of the current fi scal year. 
Import volumes of chilled beef and 
frozen beef are measured separately, 
so the safeguard can be triggered for 
one or both categories of beef in a 
given quarter. The sudden losses of 
Canada and then the United States 
from the market reduced import 
volumes, thereby reducing safeguard 
trigger levels. As the end of the fi rst 
quarter of JFY 2005 (April-June) ap-
proached, concern arose that the 
safeguard would be triggered by in-
creased imports from Australia.
TABLE 1. TOP FIVE MARKETS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF VARIETY MEAT EXPORTS, 
JANUARY-APRIL 2005 COMPARED WITH JANUARY-APRIL 2003 AND 2004
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Despite requests from major 
trading partners, Japan has never 
failed to implement higher safe-
guard tariffs on either beef or pork, 
regardless of the market conditions 
that created the ebbs and surges in 
import volume. Table 2 shows Japa-
nese imports in 2003 before the fi rst 
BSE case was found in the United 
States, and in 2004 with both the 
United States and Canada banned 
from the market. The lower import 
levels in JFY 2004 make it more 
likely that beef safeguards will be 
triggered after the United States and 
Canada re-enter the market.
INCREASED PROCESSING CAPACITY         
IN CANADA
U.S. beef will also face pressure from 
the increase in Canadian slaughter 
capacity necessitated by the extend-
ed closing of the U.S. border to live 
Canadian cattle. In June 2004, Cana-
da was slaughtering around 77,000 
head of cattle per week, already a 
high slaughter rate for the Canadian 
industry. In June 2005, the Canadian 
Meat Council estimated that Cana-
dian slaughter capacity could reach 
107,000 head per week by November. 
The additional 30,000 head per week 
would equal 1.5 million more head 
per year—this at a time when the 
United States is facing underutilized 
beef slaughter capacity.
In 2002, the last full year of live 
exports to the United States, Canada 
slaughtered about 3.5 million cattle 
in inspected facilities and exported 
just over 1.0 million live cattle to the 
United States for slaughter (see Ta-
ble 3). By 2004, Canadian slaughter 
increased to more than 3.9 million 
head with no live exports. At the 
same time, the size of the domestic 
herd increased from 13.8 million 
head in 2003 to 16.8 million head in 
2004 (January 1 herd inventories). 
Part of this expansion is the result 
of herd aging, as producers carried 
8.6 percent more beef cattle in 2004. 
To counter this problem, Canada 
has funded a Herd Management for 
Older Animals Program to help cull 
older animals from the national herd. 
As a result, many older animals will 
not be slaughtered for beef.
Even with the increase in herd 
size, the slaughter capacity esti-
mated to be on-line by November 
would more than accommodate all 
of Canada’s slaughter needs without 
exporting live cattle. This is not to 
say that Canada will not export live 
cattle to the United States now that 
an appeals court has ruled that the 
border can be reopened, and some 
of Canada’s increased capacity can 
be ramped back down relatively 
quickly. But Canadian cattlemen will 
have more options. The capacity to 
kill all of the approximately 800,000 
head of steers and heifers formerly 
sent to the United States gives 
Canada the potential to harvest an 
additional 294,000 metric tons (car-
cass weight basis) of young, export-
able beef.
Given that Canada and the 
United States likely will enter many 
markets at about the same time, 
both offer essentially the same qual-
ity and types of beef on a commod-
ity basis, and both are shipping beef 
similar distances to many foreign 
markets, a higher volume of export-
able beef in Canada will slow the 
speed at which the United States 
recovers market share in other 
countries. Canada’s separate export 
promotion programs and national 
cattle identifi cation program will 
make Canadian beef highly competi-
tive against U.S. beef.
MARKET OUTLOOK POST-BSE
Based on events since BSE-positive 
animals were found in the United 
States, the United States will fi nd 
itself in a different position in world 
TABLE 2. QUARTERLY JAPANESE BEEF IMPORTS (METRIC TONS), JFY 2003 AND 2004
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF CANADIAN CATTLE SLAUGHTERED IN CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES, 2000-2004
Continued on page 13
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still see the potential for profi t in 
the ethanol market. In March of 
this year, the Chicago Board of 
Trade began trading ethanol futures 
contracts, providing a fi nancial 
tool to mitigate risk in the ethanol 
industry. While the trading volume 
has been small, the ethanol futures 
price movements have paralleled the 
cash price movements. Over the last 
month, ethanol futures have gone up 
by 30¢ per gallon. The nearby con-
tracts are now trading in the $1.60 
per gallon range, with the end-of-
year contracts priced around $1.50 
per gallon. 
Given the ethanol futures con-
tracts, we have modifi ed our profi t-
ability index for ethanol. Our index 
compares the costs of the inputs 
into ethanol, corn and natural gas, 
to the revenues from ethanol and its 
co-products, such as dried distillers 
grains and solubles (DDGS). The index 
can be thought of as a gross margin 
for ethanol production, the difference 
between per unit revenues and costs 
of ethanol production. The index 
does not imply that all ethanol plants 
will make a profi t, but it does signal 
the potential for profi ts within the 
industry. With current ethanol, corn, 
and natural gas futures prices, we can 
calculate the expected values of the 
profi tability index for ethanol produc-
tion. Based on a dry-mill production 
technique for ethanol, one bushel of 
corn and 165 thousand British ther-
mal units of natural gas are needed to 
create 2.7 gallons of ethanol and 17 
pounds of DDGS. Figure 3 shows the 
historical and projected levels of the 
profi tability index. Given the futures 
prices on July 14, 2005, the profi tabil-
ity index for ethanol in August 2005 
is at 58¢ per gallon of ethanol, mean-
ing the per gallon expected revenues 
from ethanol and DDGS exceed the 
per gallon expected costs of corn and 
natural gas by 58¢. But the futures 
prices show a downward trend in 
ethanol prices and upward trends 
in corn and natural gas prices. For 
December 2005, the index is down to 
33¢ per gallon. It is still positive, re-
fl ecting the possibility of profi ts in the 
industry, but highlights the expected 
tightening in the ethanol market.
Over the last 15 months the 
ethanol industry has gone through 
a volatile period. The industry has 
experienced signifi cant growth and 
dramatic price swings. Given the 
planned expansions in ethanol plant 
capacities and a renewed effort by 
Congress to pass an energy bill, the 
ethanol industry is looking to con-
tinue its growth, but until the de-
mand and infrastructure for ethanol 
mature, we can expect to see more 
dramatic price swings in ethanol’s 
future that are not necessarily re-
lated to events in oil markets. ◆
FIGURE 3. HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED ETHANOL GROSS MARGINS
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beef markets. Mexico has become 
and will remain the largest market 
for U.S. beef and beef variety meats 
for some time. To balance demand 
for the types and cuts of beef the 
U.S. industry produces, the United 
States will face an uphill battle in 
recapturing market share in other 
countries, especially in high-value 
markets that have been highly re-
sistant to accepting U.S. beef. Once 
Japan reopens to U.S. beef, that 
country’s beef safeguard mecha-
nism is likely to hamper these ef-
forts because of lower quarterly 
trigger levels. And, closing the bor-
der to Canadian live cattle has exac-
erbated these challenges because 
the United States will face Canada’s 
increased ability to place high-qual-
ity beef into world markets. ◆
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